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Introduction
Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) activity is a growing concern amongst policymakers -which is reflected in an extensive set of legal changes 1 -and managers -who actively participate in lobbying campaigns
2
. The main issue is the drain of resources that these agents impose on all participants in the US economy -the context of our study and primary PAEs' targeted country (Reitzig, Henkel, & Heath, 2007) . As an example, it is estimated that the aggregate losses to the defendants involved in opportunistic litigation from 2000 to 2010 reached $87.6 billion .
PAEs are opportunistic litigators whose business model revolves around obtaining excessive damage awards through enforcing patents in one-shot trials (Reitzig, Henkel, & Schneider, 2010) . These agents are firms who acquired the ownership of a patent from third partiesfrequently from a bankrupt company (Dekkers & Tietze, 2014) -without the intention of using, commercializing or granting a license (McDonough III, 2006) . Instead, these opportunistic litigators engage resources in scanning alleged infringers and hide their intellectual property in order to be infringed (Reitzig et al., 2007) . They keep waiting until a firm has engaged in a costly sunk investment and after that, enforce their property rights against the manufacturer who has inadvertently infringed the PAE's intellectual property rights. What they try to provoke is a hold-up situation, avoiding that the operating company can "invent around." By applying what we call a "keep-and-seek" strategy, PAEs maintain their intellectual property rights hidden and focus on identifying corporate "negligence" or monitoring deficiency (Reitzig et al., 2007) .
1 Reflecting the policy markers' concern, from 2013-2017 US Congress has considered over a dozen of bills proposing to regulate the assertion of patents: The Innovation Act (H.R. 3309), the Patent Transparency and Improvements Act (S. 1720), the Patent Quality Improvement Act (S. 866), the Patent Abuse Reduction Act (S. Consistently with the adverse practices described above, researchers has identified the following two categories of potential harms 3 . On the one hand, patent assertion activity can impose litigation costs that are "unrealistic" (Reitzig et al., 2007, p. 134) in relation to the patented technology at issue (Henkel & Reitzig, 2008; Reitzig et al., 2010) .On the other hand, an increase in firms' additional costs due to opportunistic litigation can divert technical talent, managerial attention and other corporate resources away from the main activity of the operating company, a result that decreases the social welfare Cohen, Gurun, & Kominers, 2014; Tucker, 2011) . These findings suggest that companies are in a vulnerable situation when they are involved in PAE litigation.
Viewing strategic alliances as cooperation links that improve the strategic position of the firms by providing resources that they lack (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000) , we examine whether companies use alliance formation as a strategic alternative to maintain their competitive position while they are facing to opportunistic litigation. From the resource-based perspective,
we understand companies as bundles of tangible (i.e., financial assets) or intangible (i.e.managerial skills) resources that can be shared through alliances. That is, through partnerships agreements, accused companies can obtain resources that buffer external pressures, being particularly relevant during periods of exogenous shocks (Miner, Amburgey, & Stearns, 1990) . In this regard, opportunistic litigation can be understood as an adverse event that eventually may become companies more vulnerable due to a reallocation of resources to paying litigation costs. Therefore, the goal of this research is to examine the impact of opportunistic litigation on alliance formation.
Our study yields interesting insights. We find that targeted companies engage in more alliance agreements after a lawsuit bring by a PAE. Moreover, in order to go further, we drill this relationship by explicitly considering average and individual effects. We also test our assumption of the transfer of resources to deal with litigation costs. In doing so, we operationalize some features of the legal process as well as some indicators of the firms' financial health as proxy variables.
We believe advancing this understanding is important for several reasons. First, while previous studies suggest that patent assertion activity hurts innovation in general terms, and particularly, decreases firms' R&D expenditure (see Cohen, Gurun, & Kominers, 2014; Smeets, 2014 , among others), we know little about their effects on firms' strategic decisions. Yet, to our knowledge, no study has assess patent assertion activity on firms' collaborative behavior despite its importance to maintain firms' competitive advantage.
Second, an overwhelmed legal system and the pressures exerted by some managerial lobbies have lead policymakers to propose some bills to regulate the assertion of patents but that implicitly lead to protect (inadvertent) infringers (Tucker, 2011) . This fact has led to a controversial debate among stakeholders from different industries. Alternatively, it could be interesting to inform policymakers of strategic decisions that operating companies implement so that policymakers can institutionally ease their implementation (i.e., promoting inter-firms collaborative agreements with tax incentives). Finally, we perform this study in an empirically way, which should be highlighted, taking into consideration the difficulty in measuring PAE activity that has repeatedly been emphasized in the literature Fischer & Henkel, 2012; Pénin, 2012 This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical insights and the background discussion that drive our proposition about the positive effect of opportunistic litigation on firms' collaborative behavior. Section 3 describes the data, variables and methods.
Section 4 overviews our results and Section 5 discusses our main contributions, implications of our study and future research.
PAE litigation, legal costs, and collaborative behavior
In this section, we proceed to explore the (potential) PAE effect on firms' collaborative behavior. We argue that PAE activity contributes positively to alliance formation. In order to go further with this statement, we examine potential mechanisms to explain this relationship:
characteristics of lawsuits and firms' resources endowment.
Alliances are defined as voluntary cooperative arrangements among independent firms, designed to exchange or share resources to achieve goals that are mutually beneficial (Gulati, 1998; Kogut, 1988) . They can take different forms, ranging from collaborative R&D agreements to co-marketing arrangements, and can occur as a result of a wide range of motives (Lavie, 2007; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996) . Precisely, a large portion of the literature has focused on why firms form alliances. Such cooperative agreements can provide companies with several advantages such as cost sharing, risk reduction and rapid response to unexpected situations (Lavie, 2007) From a theoretical perspective, a well-known approach to alliance formation is resource-based framework (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002; Miotti & Sachwald, 2003) . Through this approach, companies are seen as bundles of heterogeneous resources. Differences in firms' resource endowment are related to differences in firms'
performance. Thus, firms' resource profile plays an important role. In this sense, Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven (1996) propose that alliances are formed when firms are in a vulnerable position or when firms are in such strong social position that have enough resources to attract partners.
Focusing on the vulnerable position, this occurs when companies are in a challenging market situation, or they are undertaking expensive or risky strategies.
In this sense, the literature about opportunistic litigation suggests that the detrimental effects of PAEs increase transaction costs and uncertainty (Pénin, 2012) , dissipate social value reducing manufacturers' incentives to innovate Reitzig et al., 2007) and decrease the rate of invention (Turner, 2015) . In addition, patent assertion activity can be overcompensated in relation to the real impact of the patent infringement (Reitzig et al., 2007) .
As consequence, an increase in litigation costs can divert technical talent, managerial attention and other corporate resources away from the main activity of the operating company Cohen et al., 2014; Federal Trade Commission, 2016; Tucker, 2011 This statement summarizes the costs of litigation that companies face. Although, in general terms, it is perceived that the more litigious environments increase firms' risk of being exposed to significant direct and indirect costs, particularly, in those lawsuits filed by PAEs, the cost of litigation falls more heavily on the accused infringer (Tucker, 2011) . To achieve a better understanding of this previous premise, it is necessary to understand the operating logic of the majority of technological industries in the absence of opportunistic litigation. Traditionally, patents had been used as a way of protecting the firm's innovation against others, so if a company A sued the company B, B could answer with a counterclaim against A. When both of them are manufacturers, both face to equal (potential) losses, at least initially. Basically, companies had established implicit "non-aggression pacts" (Reitzig et al., 2007) .
However, with the advent of opportunistic litigators, this "non-aggression status quo" is broken.
As PAEs do not actually manufacture anything, and often, they are lawyers (Columbia & Blasberg, 2006) , they bear fewer costs regarding discovery and preparing for trial (Chien, 2009 ). These facts cause that lawsuits filed by PAEs are clearly asymmetric in terms of costs.
In addition to legal cost (i.e., attorneys' fees), companies also face other costs of indirect nature.
Thus, in the above fragment, Boswell identifies some of them such as the wasting time for developer and executives. Distractions to management is a common cost mentioned in the literature (i.e. Bessen & Meurer, 2007 , 2008 . Thus, Bessen and Meurer (2008) pose that business activities could be interrupted because managers and researchers must commit a significant amount of time in preparing for litigation and appearing in court. Moreover, other indirect costs have been already identified. On the one hand, financial cost arising from greater risk, including risk of bankruptcy (Bessen & Meurer, 2007; Feldman & Price II, 2014; Kiebzak, Rafert, & Tucker, 2016) . On the other hand, delays in implementing marketing strategies (Bereskin, Hsu, Latham, & Wang, 2017) or leakages on confidential information (Bessen & Meurer, 2007) .
Therefore, the inability of targeted firms to defend against opportunistic litigation entails potential losses that hamper innovation and imply (potential) low performance Lemley, 2008; Merges, 2009; Pohlmann & Opitz, 2013) . Clearly, the presence of PAEs leads companies to face additional costs and risks that they did not have in the prelitigation situation. From this weaker position,, alliances can provide companies to critical resources to buffer PAE effects. For example, following the classification of (Das & Teng, 2000, p. 24) , alliances can provide, at least, four categories of important resources. First, financial resources. The availability of capital could smooth profit pressures and ensure predictable resources flows (Miner et al., 1990) . Second, technological resources. Greater access to a technological resource such as superior R&D capability which could help targeted firms to cope with the detrimental effects of PAEs on innovation. In this regard, Cohen et al.
(2014) analyzing a sample of publicly listed firms, find a negative impact of trolls' attacks on R&D expenditure. Similarity, Bessen & Meurer (2014) conclude that troll litigation reduces innovation incentives for any type of company. Third, alliances also can provide physical resources. As an example (Das & Teng, 2000) mention new distribution channels. Fostering distribution networks could mitigate some indirect costs related to marketing delays. Finally, managerial resources obtained through alliance agreements could help targeted firms' managers with time-management and decision-making.
All these insights together lead us to argue that patent litigation driven by PAEs have a positive impact on alliance formation. As we argue, alliance formation could be understood as a tool to obtain resources when companies are in a vulnerable situation because of opportunistic litigation. Therefore, the mechanisms that we propose are related to the characteristics of the lawsuits and the firms' resource endowment.
Data and methodology
In what follows, we describe our empirical strategy to test the ideas developed above. Firstly, we give information on the data sources and about sample formation. In a next step, we explain the variables. Finally, we specify our model and expose the applied methodology to investigate the relationship between patent assertion activity and alliance formation in a subsequent period.
Data
We obtained data from five different sources. We integrated financial data from Compustat with data on corporate subsidiaries from CorpWatch, with litigation data from RPX website and with information on alliances agreements from SDC Platinum as well as information about patents retrieved from PATSTAT database. After this process, we obtain a firm-level data from the US. listed companies classified by standard industrial classification (SIC) (identified by two-digit SIC categories: 28, 35, 36, 38, 48 and 73) .
The period of our sample covers from January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2008. The reason to choose this period is twofold. First, the identification of the troll's activity is roughly dated at the beginning of the 2000s. Second, the availability of the different databases.
Financial data
We identified from Compustat all firms which are publicly traded, from January 1, 2003, to
December 31, 2008, operating in the following two-digit SIC categories: 28, 35, 36, 38, 48 and 73). These sectors are chosen because a general consensus exists in delimiting high-tech industry as the main target of PAEs (Allison, Lemley, & Walker, 2009; Henkel & Reitzig, 2008a; Pénin, 2012; Reitzig et al., 2007) .
This process yielded a total of 3,433 firms split into six different industries with 1,188 firms (34.61%) in chemicals and allied products (28), 128 firms (3.73%) in industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment (35), 521 firms (15.18%) in electronic and other electrical equipment and components, except computer equipment (36), 479 firms (13.95%) in measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments; photographic, medical and optical goods;
watches and clocks (38), 258 firms (7.52%) in communications (48) and, 859 (25.02%) in business services (73).
Data on corporate subsidiaries
A potential concern about the previously firm-level data is that we only capture publicly traded companies. The reason is that the availability of financial information for this type of companies is higher because they have a legal obligation to publish their annual accounts.
Although this fact does not seem to be a significant shortcoming taking into account that these firms are responsible for the major (US) R&D (Bessen & Meurer, 2005) , it could lead to underestimating the number of litigious that these companies suffer. For this reason, we retrieved all the subsidiaries of the firms identified in Compustat. We collect data on subsidiaries provided by Corpwatch. CorpWatch API uses parsers to retrieve the subsidiary relationship information from Exhibit 21 of the 10-K forms required to file by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as part of the company' annual report.
Moreover, the use of this data enables us to detected potential changes of name of the firms which will be relevant to apply the name-matched matching procedure that will be described in Section 3. One caveat is that companies do not submit information in a standardization format which makes more difficult to parse the information. Nevertheless, it is considering that, at least, 90% of the subsidiary companies are correctly parsed. A manual check was conducted to minimize errors in the identification of companies and subsidiaries.
Litigation data
We collect data on patent litigation from RPX's website (https://insight.rpxcorp.com/ Declaratory Judgments cases were deleted from the analysis following the same argument of Smeets (2014) . That is, in these cases, patent holders are mostly the defendant which means that a manufacturing firm, the alleged infringer, holds the role of plaintiff.
It is worth mentioning that we were able to classify those lawsuits according to the primary SIC of each of the defendants after performing a name-matched matching procedure (see section 3.1.6).
A potential limitation is that we only use data on observed patent litigation. Unfortunately, no comprehensive dataset of demand letters and other informal patent assertions by opportunistic litigators exits. Nevertheless, as discussed by Cohen et al., (2014) , informal patent assertions are in decline and is expected to continue falling principally due to two main drivers. First, the decreasing credibility of informal patent assertions, since a patent troll had a viable case, it would sue instead of sending letters which is a less credible signal. Second, the rise of legislation to assume responsibility for unsubstantiated demand letters.
We desegregated each case by defendant-level, which represents a significant improvement over previous studies that are not able to identify defendants properly. For example, Kiebzak et al. (2016) concede that they are not able to perform a manual review and Smeets (2014) just identifies the primary defendant.
Data on partnership agreements
We retrieved information from SDC Platinum database, provided by Thomson Reuters, which compiles more than 140000 publicly announced alliances from 1984. SDC Platinum database is showed as the more consistent database considering its alternatives (MERIT_CATI or RCAP, amongst other) (Schilling, 2009 ). The companies of our sample signed a total of 4,106 alliance agreements from 2003 to 2008. We did not extend the study after 2008 since, after this year, the majority of the alliances were not confirmed by SDC, being classified in other categories such as "pending."
Data on patents
We obtain firm-level patent information from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT). This database contains patent information issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
Sample
This list of publicly traded companies and their subsidiaries retrieving from CropWatch enabled us to match all datasets. To do so, we employed a name-matched matching procedure. This way of combining databases is essential to merge databases where there are no codes to identify companies, particularly, for data on R&D, data on intellectual property rights and data on the financial status of firms (Thoma et al., 2010) .
Although we believe that we are the first scholars to create complete litigation, financial, and patent dataset applying the name harmonization to defendants, our use of name-matched matching procedure in management research is far from unique (see e.g. Agrawal, Bhattacharya, & Hasija, 2016; Galasso, Schankerman, & Serrano, 2013; Thursby, Fuller, & Thursby, 2009; Zobel, Balsmeier, & Chesbrough, 2016) .
Basically, it is a three-step process: a parsing stage, a matching stage and a filtering stage (Raffo & Lhuillery, 2009 ). 4 In a first phase, we standardize the names of companies that comprising the different datasets. The standardization is performed adapting the work developed by Hall (2008) 5 and improved by Bessen (2010) 6 . Subsequently, the matching is carried out by constructing a matching scored (the Levenshtein distance or edit distance) between strings. To 4 They can also be referred as "data pre-processing", "name cleaning" and "harmonization results" (Magerman, Van Looy, & Song, 2006) or in the context of a software prototype, first software module, referring to the cleaning phase; second software module regards the matching phase and third software module as a refinement process (Thoma et al., 2010) . 5 Retrieving from: http://eml.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/pat/namematch.html 6 Retrieving from: https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home do that, we apply a vectorial decomposition of texts. We implement a mechanism based on the division of name strings into sequences of characters ("tokens") (used, e.g., by Galasso et al., 2013) . Basically, this approach generates a measure of similarity between different company names. The algorithm classifies as perfectly matching, those names which degree of quality is equal to 1.
We combined our automatic matching algorithm with an extensive manual review. We sought a secondary source to verify the affiliation for each remaining name. We check all the resulting matching pairs which degree of equality is above 0.8. Table 1 shows the number and percentage of names that we are able to match through the nine different name-matched matching procedure that we carried out. We report the number of perfect pairings (classified as 1 by the algorithm) and the number of company's names that were classified as 1 after being checked manually.
<< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >>
We execute this procedure for retrieving and joining all information about litigation, patents and alliance agreements with our list of publicly traded companies and their subsidiaries retrieving from Compustat and CropWatch.
Variables
In this section, we explain all the variable included in the model. First, we define the dependent variables. Second, the independent variable is explained. Third, we develop an explanation about control variables. All the definitions of variables are contained in Table 2 .
<< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >>

Dependent variable
The explanatory variable in our model, Strategic Alliances, is a variable that captures the number of alliances a company i has established in a year t. As we discuss in Section 2 alliances can provide access to different type of resources that companies lack. For this reason, this research uses all kind of alliances, R&D alliances, and non-R&D alliances.
Main explanatory variables
The independent variable directly associated with the discussion above is Opportunistic Litigation (Equation 2). Opportunistic Litigation is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a company has been attacked by an opportunistic litigator. Opportunistic Litigation also is a dependent variable in the first stage of our endogenous binary-variable model.
To identify opportunistic litigators (patent trolls), we use as a start point the same approach of Kiebzak, Rafert, & Tucker (2016, p. 222) . They consider a patent troll as a "frequent litigator.", that is entities that have filed a considerable number of lawsuits. In our empirical approach, we operationalize this approach from a conservative perspective, using as a threshold, the 90 th percentile. Thus, opportunistic litigators are companies which number of attacks (lawsuits) filed is above this score. To do that, we counted the number of lawsuits that a company filed per year. This empirical approach to identifying potential opportunistic litigators is also in line with Galasso et al., (2013) who identify as "serial litigants" (p.303) those companies that are on the top decile of intellectual property right purchases.
The main shortcoming of this measure, as Kiebzak et al., (2016) admitted, is that could cover operating firms that for whatever reason are fighting for their intellectual property rights in a court, and however, it could exclude those opportunistic litigators that are more selective in choosing their targeted firms. For this reason, we performed an identification process of opportunistic litigators. First, we discarded as opportunistic litigators, all the subsidiaries of the companies that we have identified as operating firms using Compustat. Second, we built our own list of opportunistic litigators by collecting all the scattered examples that we have found in the literature. In addition, we manually check all the plaintiff's names that were on the top percentile of our sample. Finally, although no comprehensive directory of opportunistic litigators exits, we contrasted our initial sample based on the measurement of frequent litigator with a 20% of the random sample of Non-Practicing Entity (NPE) Litigation Dataset. This dataset contains a tentative classification of Non-Practicing Entity (NPE), by categorizing plaintiffs in each case into one of 13 types of patent asserter. As the purpose of this measure is to identify those companies that use their intellectual property rights opportunistically, only companies classified in 1 (acquired patents), 4 (corporate heritage) and 5 (individual/inventor started company) categories are considered (see Miller (2015) for a more detailed explanation about this classification).
By implementing all these steps, we believe that we obtain a more sophisticated measure of opportunistic litigator than the original one only based on frequent litigators. In doing so, we identified some companies that initially were categorized as opportunistic litigators, and they are not, as well as, we recognized new opportunistic litigators whose levels of litigation are lower than percentile 90 of our sample. Finally, we were able to come up with a tentative list of companies that (potentially) show opportunistic behavior.
Although the variable described above, Opportunistic Litigation, is the variable that we use in all the models, we tried to clean more this way to capture potential opportunistic litigators by adding some extra filters. Thus, we matched the plaintiff names to an apparently reliable list, available on Internet, which 7 compiles potential opportunistic litigators from public sources of reported frequent litigators. However, this source warns that the list can suffer from potential inaccuracies. We also applied an "association rule" by considering that in those case with various plaintiffs where at least one has been previously identified as an opportunistic litigator, the rest of plaintiffs that are litigating together with this company, are also opportunistic litigators. The underlying logic is that operating companies that are suffering the detrimental effects of trolls are not likely to join forces with this agents, at least theoretically. The obtained variables of applying these extra filters were also used in all the models that we propose and, we obtained analogous results to those that we present in this paper 8 .
The main explanatory variable in the first equation of the endogenous dummy-variable model refers to lawsuits filed in the Eastern District of Texas. We create this variable by summing the total number of lawsuits in which an operating company is involved per year that has been filed in Eastern District of Texas regardless the nature of the plaintiff (opportunistic litigator or not).
Control variables
Following, we describe the control variables that we include in the model.
R&D Intensity. This variable is related to the level of technological sophistication of a firm and
captures the firm-level dedication to knowledge creation (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005) . We measure this variable as the proportion of operating expenditure devoted to R&D activities of the firm i for the period t.
Stock of Patent Applications (ApplicationStock). This variable measures the stock of patent
applications by applying the perpetual inventory method. It is calculated as:
Where Applicationsit represents the productivity of the firm at generating potential inventions given its accumulative knowledge capital, and it is defined as the application stock of firm i at the year t. Here, we follow convention and resort to the traditional 15% of depreciation rate per year (Hall et al., 2005; McGahan & Silverman, 2006) . We include this variable using the logarithm value. Fixed Assets Stock. The proportion of the net fixed assets with regard to the total firms' assets.
Potential partners could be interested in the combination of specialized assets through the formation of alliances (Colombo, Grilli, & Piva, 2006) .
Country of Incorporation.
A dummy is included to control by the location of the public company.
Attacks. Number of plaintiffs (opportunistic litigators or not) that have sued the company i for the year t.
Not Patent. A binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm i does not have any patent at t, and 0 otherwise.
Sectorial activity and time dummies.
Industry dummies and time dummies and are also incorporated to control for time-fixed effects and industrial fixed-effects. These are sources of unobserved heterogeneity that might affect alliance formation.
Empirical approach
Impact of opportunistic litigation on alliance formation
The objective of the empirical analysis is to determine whether the opportunistic litigation affects the number of collaborative agreements that companies reach after being sued by a PAE. In order to do that, we propose the following model: where Strategic Alliancest+1 is the outcome of interest, the propensity to form alliances, which is the number of alliances that a company establishes in the subsequent period (the following year). The variable in interest is Opportunistic Litigation, a binary variable indicating the existence of opportunistic litigation. The estimated coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive according to our explanation in Section 2. The rest are variables commonly used in the alliance formation literature (see Section 3.2 for a more detailed explanation). Subscript i refers to firm and t to period.
As Opportunistic Litigation is an endogenous variable, we apply a Poisson regression model that deal with endogenous binary-treatment variables (whether the company has received an attack). This permits to analyze a model on which there is a dichotomy variable that is
endogenous for the outcome. That is, these models are able to deal with correlations between the unobservables that affect the treatment and the potential outcomes (Terza, 1998) .
Operationally, this is a two-step model. The first stage consists of the model predicting the probability to be litigated by an opportunistic litigator. In particular, the following model is estimated:
Equation (1):
Opportunistic Litigation it = β0 + β1 Texas Casesit-1 + β2 Attacksit-1 + β3 R&D intensityit-1 + β4 R&D_intensityit- Where Opportunistic Litigation it is the outcome of interest, a dummy equal to 1 if the firm was litigated by an opportunistic litigator in a particular year. In our attempt to identify the causal effect, our identification strategy focuses on Texas Cases variable. There is no a reason to think that receive a claim from the Eastern District of Texas should affect the alliance formation process directly but, if our troll forum-shopping conjecture is true, should predict very good the fact of being attacked by a PAE. In addition,we also propose that the number of plaintiffs that annually sues a company (Attacks) as an explanatory variable.
Equation (2):
where Yit is the outcome, Strategic Alliances. The variable in interest is Opportunistic Litigation, a binary variable indicating the existence of opportunistic litigation (equal to 1 if the firm has been litigated). Xit is a set of control variables commonly used in the alliance formation literature , and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. In order to control for sources of time and industry-varying heterogeneity, we include a set of control dummies in both regressions.
As a third method, we estimate the average impact of opportunistic litigation on alliance formation. We follow previous studies by using a matching approach to estimate this relationship (Smeets, 2014) . This methodology generates the counterfactual outcome by identifying non-treated twin firms (non-attacked), which are similar in the rest of exogenous features. As Chapman, Lucena, & Afcha (2018) explain that matching generates the average effect by comparing the alliance formation outcome when a firm is sued by an opportunistic litigator to the counterfactual alliance formation outcome if the firm would not have been attacked. We follow the literature standard by applying propensity score nearest neighbor matching (PSM) (Caliendo 2005).
Differential impact of litigation
In the second stage of our analysis, we turn our attention to the differential impact of opportunistic litigation on alliance formation. The concept of differential gains suggests that distinct companies experience different impacts on alliance formation from litigation, which could be in terms of the direction (i.e., positive or negative) and/or magnitude of the impact.
To identify the individual impact effect, we employ the approach deploy by (xxxx pendiente) and recently applied in the assessment of R&D policies (Chapman, Lucena, & Afcha, 2018) .
To implement this methodology, we first identify the individual level impact of litigation on alliance formation for each treated firm as follow:
Where stands for the individual effect. That is, the difference between the alliance formation of a treated firm i (Yi) and the counterfactual level of alliance formation the threated firm would have had in the absence of litigation (̂). Examining the distribution of permits insight into the extent of differential effects generated by opportunistic litigation on alliance formation.
Robutness check. We complement our study by applying the general method of moments (GMM) as a robustness check (see Apendix A. Table 1) 4. Results Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the two equations of the analysis. Table 4 shows the results of the Poisson regression analysis following the specification described in Section 3.2. Examining the results (Equation 2), we note that they provide support to our assumption that being sued by an opportunistic litigator impact positively on subsequent alliance formation. The next step is to estimate the average treatment effect on the litigated companies. Thus, in estimating marginal effects, we find that litigated companies will establish 1.40 more alliances that they would if they were not sued (in a one year period).
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Previously to the Equation 2, we first run a probit model to obtain the predicted probability of being sued by an opportunistic litigator (Equation 1).
Next, we match firms based on the propensity score. Table 5 shows that significant prematching differences exist between the treated and the control groups in all characteristics.
However, as can be seen in Table 6 , these differences have been removed after the matching procedure. Explained differently, comparing (pseudo) R-squared of the two models, before (0.349) and after (0.013) of applying the matching procedure, show that any remaining differences in alliance formation can now be attributed to opportunistic litigation. Using this methodology, the number of alliances after receiving an attack (period t+1) is, on average, a 35,07% higher.
<< INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE >>   << INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE >> After identifying the individual level impact of opportunistic litigation on alliance formation, we now go further in the comprehension of by examining its distribution. As can be seen in the Figure 1 , the effect has a heterogeneous nature.
<< INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >>
Focusing on this positive effect, we now examine the theorized effect of resources and litigious costs (Table 7) . To do that, we use the individual level of opportunistic litigation on alliance formation as our explained variable in an ordinary least squared regression model. As independent variables, we propose a set of variables that have been identified by the previous literature as a dimension of the complexity of a legal process, and consequently, associated with more intensive litigation cost. Thus, in the Model 1 (Table 7) , we follow Kesan and Ball (2006) who use the length of the patent lawsuits, as the number of days from the opportunistic litigator sued the alleged infringer to the judge's ruling, as a proxy for patent litigation cost. In an analogous context, Galasso (2010) also use the length of the patent lawsuit as a proxy for the speed of technology diffusion through licensing. The underlying idea is that those lawsuits that last longer generate more litigation costs to the defendant because of the persistence of the effect (Smeets, 2014) .
<< INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE >>
In Model 2, we use the number of legal documents filed in a patent lawsuit as another way to capture the complexity of the legal process. These documents can involve a quite range of topics such as magistrate orders or complaints by one of the litigants. In this sense, this measure could capture time spent by defendants' lawyers working on an opportunistic lawsuit (Kesan and Ball, 2006) . From the same approach, we also propose the number of asserted patents and accused products respectively (Models 3 and 4) as a proxy for patent litigation costs.
Because of the high correlation between these four variables, we analyze each of these dimensions of the litigation cost in independent models.
Moreover, we also include some indicators of the firms' financial health. On the one hand, we include the leverage ratio (debt-to-total assets ratio) that indicates the level of assets that are being financing by debt.On the other hand, Working capital is defined as the net amount of short-term assets and is the result of the difference between current assets minus current liabilities. This variable is commonly used as an indicator of the firm's short-term operating liquidity. As is common in the financial constraints literature, we scale this variable by firms'assets (Czarnitzki, Hottenrott, & Thorwarth, 2011) .
We observe a positive and statistically significant effect for all the variables related to the dimensions of litigations except for the length of the lawsuits. Regarding financial indicators, the working capital has a positive and significant effect.
Discussion and conclusions
This study investigates the impact of opportunistic litigation on firms' alliance formation. First, the analysis reveals a positive and significant relationship (Model 1). That is, when companies are litigated by PAEs, they engage in a greater number of alliance agreements in the subsequent period. Second, we find that litigated companies establish 1.40 alliances more than they would form if they were not sued. Third, our results further reveal the mechanism that drives this positive relationship. We argue that opportunistic litigation generates additional costs for accused companies. In order to buffer these negative effects, operating firms use alliances to obtain similar resources to those that they had reallocated to litigate. In line with (Smeets, 2014) Kesan and Ball, 2006) , we find that the costs of litigation are positive and statistically significant (Model 3, 4 and 5). Interestingly, the Model 2 shows that the length of the lawsuit has not a significant effect. A potential explanation is that the number of days could be capturing inherent delays in the US legal system instead of the complexity of the opportunistic lawsuits. Regarding the financial health of the company, working capital has a negative and significant impact on all the models (Model 2, 3, 4 and 5). This result shows that potential liquidity problems act as a driver of alliance formation in an opportunistic litigation context.
However, the amount of debt (leverage ratio) is not significant.
Our results complement and extend previous studies focused on opportunistic litigation, by performing the first research that demonstrates that a positive effect of PAE litigation on firms collaborative behavior. Some anecdotal suggestions suggest a potential negative effect of PAE litigation on firms' collaborative behavior. As an example, mention that litigation may endanger cooperative development because of a potential "contagion effect."
PAEs could eventually sue suppliers and customers or any other party that had made, used o sold the patented technology without permission. Conversely, (Tucker, 2011) , by studying a drop in sales after PAE litigation, determines that such slowdown is not due to a decrease in demand. Instead, the decline in sales is due to a decision of the own litigated company. This result seems to reject the potential "contagion effect." Nevertheless, a negative effect exists as our results show (Figure 1 ) and should be studied more deeply.
We also advance understanding about the mechanisms that drive the alliance formation, particularly, from the resource-based perspective.
In addition, we perform this study in an empirically way, which should be highlighted, taking into consideration the difficulty in measuring trolls' activity that has repeatedly been emphasized in the literature Fischer & Henkel, 2012; Pénin, 2012 This study also pretends to be useful to policymakers. On the one hand, this work helps lawmakers to have a better understanding of the impact of trolls on innovation as well as it contributes to extending the knowledge about the potential strategic decisions that companies adopt when they are litigated. Knowing in advance that litigated companies use alliances as a way to maintain their competitive position when they have to divert resources to litigate, should lead policymakers to design measures for promoting and easing alliances.
Future research could improve and build on this paper in several directions. First, as we mentioned above, researchers should analyze the negative impact of opportunistic litigator on alliance formation. Second, although we think that our method has systematically captured the majority of PAEs operating in the high-tech industry, it is not possible to know if they are all.
In this sense, we agree to (Kiebzak et al., 2016 ) that more work is needed to establish how to identified PAEs.
Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe that this research provides significant contributions to the relation between opportunistic litigation and alliance formation. 
